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upr000160 180

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upr000160-180
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    Mr. W* R, Rouse d. April 2, 1952 lights and the reclamation, drainage and irrigation of land were clearly public. Although I believe that the majority opinion written by Judge Hand is sound, the fact remains that Circuit Judge Frank, wrote a very vigorous dissent in which he took the position that the Port Authority was engaged in activities ordinarily undertaken by privately owned corporations and was not exercising the sovereign powers of the state. He made a distinction between governmental functions and pro­prietary functions and would have had the Court hold that the case did not fall within the exemption provisions of the Code or the regulations thereunder, A companion case decided the same day was the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Whitens Estate, 144 Fei, (2d) i'0l9, certiorari denied, $9 I, ed. 632, involv- ing the same question with reference to interest upon bond® issued by the Tri-Borough Bridge Authority, in which the majority of the Court came to the same conclusion and Judge Frank dissented. The question involved in the above mentioned cases can not be considered to be conclusively settled because the Su­preme Court merely denied certiorari and did not decide the question on the merits. Furthermorethere is greater un­certainty with respect to the meaning of Section 23(q){l) than there is with respect to Section 22(b)(4)(A) of the Code because in addition to presenting the problem of what is a political subdivision, Section 23(q)(l| presents the problem of whether a contribution to such a political sub­division is "for exclusively public purposes", There have been a number of other decisions constru­ing Section 22(b)(4)(A) of the Code, but they do not throw much light on the problem before us because they deal pri- m$£ily with the question of whether certain instruments are "obligations" of a state or its subdivision within the mean­ing of the Code provisions. These cases are collected in an annotation in 121 A.L.R., page 1276. The only other Federal case which I find interpreting the meaning of "political subdivision" when used in a Federal statute is the case of