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1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9 « B 5 S of the statute l « | u®, SS# the court a fte r quoting it s language used f i t following language: It would seem that, in the employment of such language* i t was tiis intent ion of the Legislature to eipressly grant th© power of condemnation o f property devoted to I public use. Otherwise there could be no weaniagjto the words 1 oontesmatiom and purchase» f worse,^plants and f a c i l i t i e s ’ * The le g isla tu re , saany o f our c itie s works, plants and f a c ilit i e s in use furnishing such c itie s with heat, power, water, end lig h ts , sought to confer upon c itie s the right to acquire such plants by either purchase or fa b r ic a t io n . Certainly i f i t is not an. express grant, i t is ©t least © necessary implication* Otherwise the language be siren no fore# or e ffe c t whatever« The of the act is a .manifest intention to confer upon e^ tie » the right to acquire a l l existing public u t i li t i e s , either by condemnation or purchase* or to construct th eir own plant® fo r such purposes*’ #§% ©re aware that the re la to r argues that this question was not before the court, and that of opinion thereon is no more tban dietuit. It i s true that in the course o f the opinion the court did say that the property sought to be condemned was not then devoted to / p u b lic use, and that there was no f ' T i l t ever would be so devoted, except as such * * * J ^ * £ * * $ * * be gathered from the various resolutions of the ® board of trustees* But the court also said that i t did not wish t© rest the decision, on that p ? m & € * JpjJJ. IS^ISb, was a broader ahd more comprehensive {***«»** 1® S * S | S £ | decision could re st, and it then V ^ f ed to di w u o i decide the claim of want of power* ®te case is therefor® direct authority on the question her® involved* One o f the authorities re lie d upon by the court in the isqu ally case is Be City of Brooklyn, supra (S6 L*B.JU 270). | i 8 noted that in that case the le g isla tu re passed an act •©citing that "The public interest requires the acquisition by the (it y of Brooklyn fo r the public use, of the reservoir, w ells, lachinery, pipes, franchises and a l l other property of the long [sland la te r Company" and authorised the city to acquire the same !*or such use by condemnation. The water company contended that fche act was unconstitutional and argued that the prin ciple which forbids the taking of a c itiz e n ’ s property, except fo r a necessary public use, requres fo r the v a lid ity of the le g is la tiv e act, that the p articu lar public use b# designated, whereby the property becomes impressed with a trust fo r the benefit, o f the public| and that not only th is act is defective in that respect but i t gave no opportunity fo r a ju d ic ia l determination of the question o f the