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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 f A n examination o f the Tacoma r s Bisqually case shows that there existed express le g isla tio n fo r the taking by the municip a lity of the property in question ( lands and water righ ts fo r the purpose of generating, e le c tric power for the city) * The statute expressly provided that any incorporated city is authorised to co n stru ct, condemn and purchase. * to oh tain and operate works, p la n ts 'and f a c i l i t i e s fo r the purpose o f fu rn ish in g such city or town and the inhabitants th ereo f and oth er persons with gas, e l e c t r i c i t y and f a c i l i t i e s f o r lig h t in g , h e a tin g , fu e l and power purposes. In th at case i t was stated th at the lands sought to be condemned were not a t the time devoted to any p u b lic use, nor was there any assurance that they ever would be oth er tnan the intention and purpose of the company as expressed in various re s o lu tio n s of it s board of trustees, the Court sayingj »We do not, however, oar® to rest our decision o f the point before us upon th is ground* As applied to municipal corporations there i s a broader and more comprehensive ground growing out of. the necessities of lik e situation, and based upon a theory of greater public use and more general public benefit-* In City of Brooklyn, 38 N.S* 983 (M. Y «), £6, L.R.A. 270 it appears that the legislatu re passed an act recitin g that the public interest required the acquisition by the c ity of Brooklyn fo r the public use of the property and franchise of a water supply company and authorised the city to acquire the suae fo r such us© by condemnation* Upon attempting to do so i t was met by the objection that the act was unconstitutional, in authorizing the condemnation o f property already devoted to a public us© without designating any d ifferen t or larger ? public use to which i t was to be applied. Hie Court found no fore© in the objection and said; *while the purpose of the water company was public in it s nature, i t cannot be said to be s t r ic t ly identical with municipal purpose# 4 municipal corporation is a public and governmental agency * it hold© property fo r the general benefit with a larger scop® of use* lihen acquired by the municipality of the City of Brooklyn, the Appellant’ s property to become the%p «rt of a general system- under a single management and conducted essen tially a© a public work. I f , in order the better to subserv® the public use the appropriation of private property is necessary, even though i t be already devoted, to a si raj la r us© the right to make i t is incident to the le g is la tiv e power and i t is necessary fo r the general good that the righ t be conceded.’ In Brady vs Atlantic City, 38'jttl* 271 {B .J l} the legislatu re enacted* ’ That c itie s may take and convey from such source or sources as s@y be practicable into and through said city such quantity o f pure water as may be required * * * • Abd. • 5 .