upr000283 180

? based upon price trends of which the Commission was entitled to take judicial notice. The Court held that the exact price trend in a given year was not a matter of common notoriety which could be judicially noticed, but in addition to that, the Court held that the Commission could not take judicial notice of facts which it did not disclose to the utility at the hearing. With respect to this matter, the Court said: '!!What was done by the Commission ever, to an objection'even-deeper. C f.i s Brsouwbnj ecvt. , Nheoww­SJ. e rsCety. , 771;7 5 WeUs. t S.v .'1L7o2,u is1i7a4,n a,1 751,9 4 4U4 .LS.. ed2.5 $,1 192-621,2 1,2 632,0' m4o$r eL . theda.n 9a6n5 ,e xp96a9n,s io9n70 ,o f 2t4h eS . coCntc. ep6t5 0.o f nTohteorer iehtays bbeee­n ycoensds —rtehaes onparboltee ctliiomni tso.f thFer omi ndtihev idsutaaln dpaogianitn sto f ardubei trparroy­action— a deeper vice is this, that even now we do not know the particular or evidential facts of which the Commission took judicial notice and on which it rested its conclusion. Mot only are the facts unknown; there is no way to find them out. When price lists or trade journals or even government reports are put in evidence umpaoyn sea e trtihael ,e vtihdee ncpea rtoyr haegaarin sitt wahnod m ptahreryy iartes eoffffeecrte.d Elviemni naifr yt phreoyo fa,r e thceorpei edis inat t hlee afsitn dainn gosp pwoirtthuonuitt y prine­connection with a judicial review of the decision to ncihtayll einsg ee xtchleu dedde dhuecrtei.o ns Tmhea deC omfmriosms itohne,m . witThheh olodpipnogrtu­tfhreorme dth eh erree coarndd tthheer ee,v idceonntteinatls faicttsse lft hawti thit shaaysi ngg at­hat in gathering them it went to journals and tax lists, taiss tiifc sa ijnu dgteh e wLeireb ratro yt eolfl Cuosn,g ress’,I lanodo ketdh eya t tetahce h smtea­thus and so.1 This will never do if hearings and ap­peals are to be more than empty forms.” -26-