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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 f end sh all cause a petition to he file d in the Superior Court in the name of the city praying that just compensation be mad® fo r the property to be taken. She Court stated! wIt is the re la t o r1s f i r s t contention that the ant of the legislatu re under which the c ity is proceed** lag is not s u ffic ie n tly broad to permit the condemnation and purchase by the city , fo r a municipally owned street railway, o f a street railway owned by a corporation 'which is laready deroting the property to a public use. Atten­tion is called to the ru le of law that a statute confer­ring general authority to condemn-does not authorize such condemnation, but that such authority must be either ex­pressly conferred, or asst be necessarily implied from the language used in the grant of power. Attention Is also called to the fac t that the statute does not mention the franchises of the existing railw ay, and i t is argued with much force, from the general rule of law and from the fact o f this omission, that under the statute of this state there i s neither an express nor an implied grant of such power. The material part of the statute thought to confer the power we hare set forth in the statement. I t has seemed to us that it is su ffic ie n tly broad fo r the purposes intended.. It confers upon the c ity the authority to construct and operate a municipal­ly owned system o f street railways. In the exercise of the power I t may *condemn cad purchase , * , cable, e lectric and other railways within the lim its of the city . * » with f u l l authority to regulate and control the use and operation thereof. • « . * True the terms of the statute are somewhat general. Thar© is no specific mention of railways in active operation, nor are the franchises of such railways mentioned* But the terms used being general are s u ffic ie n tly broad to include such railways and their franchises, and since there Is no specific exception of railway® of the class mentioned, or of the franchises under which they operate, m think i t must follow that the statute was intended to include them, A grant o f power by the le g is la tiv e branch of the government, i f i t is to meet the exigency of e l l cases, must of necessity be general in it s terms, f@ p articu lar­ize Is to lim it it s scope* And here since the power is given to condemn and purchase cable, e le c tric , and other railways generally, we think it must be held rather to include a l l that the terms imply than that specific ex­ceptions were intended. The power to oondeian a railway includes the power to condemn a l l that pertains to the railway—.its operating rig h ts, it s franchises, as well, as'any other property pertaining thereto, *We sh all not review the authorities cited by the re la to r to maintain his position. It seems to us that the general question is concluded by our own case o f Tacoma v. lis q u a lly Power C o ., 57 Wash* 4£Q, 10? Pa©* I f f * That was a proceeding instituted by the city o f Tacoma to condemn and appropriate certain lands and water rig h ts, lying along the S isfu a ily river,- fo r the purpose of generating e le c tric power fo r the use of the c ity . I t was objected that the property sought to be condemned was already devoted to a sim ilar public use by it s then owners, and that the statute did not author­ize the condemnation of property so employed. The statute authorizing the condemnation is sim ilar in it s 7-