Interview with Clifford Olsen, September 20, 2004

Nevada Test Site Oral History Project University of Nevada, Las Vegas Interview with Clifford W. Olsen September 20, 2004 Las Vegas, Nevada Interview Conducted By Joan Leavitt © 2007 by UNLV Libraries Oral history is a method of collecting historical information through recorded interviews conducted by an interviewer/ researcher with an interviewee/ narrator who possesses firsthand knowledge of historically significant events. The goal is to create an archive which adds relevant material to the existing historical record. Oral history recordings and transcripts are primary source material and do not represent the final, verified, or complete narrative of the events under discussion. Rather, oral history is a spoken remembrance or dialogue, reflecting the interviewee’s memories, points of view and personal opinions about events in response to the interviewer’s specific questions. Oral history interviews document each interviewee’s personal engagement with the history in question. They are unique records, reflecting the particular meaning the interviewee draws from her/ his individual life experience. Produced by: The Nevada Test Site Oral History Project Departments of History and Sociology University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 89154- 5020 Director and Editor Mary Palevsky Principal Investigators Robert Futrell, Dept. of Sociology Andrew Kirk, Dept. of History The material in the Nevada Test Site Oral History Project archive is based upon work supported by the U. S. Dept. of Energy under award number DEFG52- 03NV99203 and the U. S. Dept. of Education under award number P116Z040093. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in these recordings and transcripts are those of project participants— oral history interviewees and/ or oral history interviewers— and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U. S. Department of Energy or the U. S. Department of Education. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 1 Interview with Clifford W. Olsen September 20, 2004 Conducted by Joan Leavitt Table of Contents Introduction: education at UC Davis ( Ph. D., Chemistry, 1962), work for N- Division ( 1962- 64) and then L- Division ( beginning 1964), LLNL 1 Talks about TEP, methods of containment, Baneberry and creation of CEP 2 DNA and other government agencies and their interest in containment 4 DoD and weapons effects tests 5 Creation of containment scientists, role of James Carothers as CEP chairman, work of the CEP 6 Creation of JTO ( ca. 1990) 12 Contrast in cultures: Americans and Soviets during the JVE ( 1988- 89) and details of visits to the USSR 14 U. S. and USSR nuclear programs: comparison of methods, test sites, containment, equipment maintenance, drilling technology 18 Differences between TEP and CEP 22 Concern: cease in testing creates vacuum in containment expertise 23 Summarizes thoughts on underground testing and “ The Learning Curve” on containment: Pascal- A and Rainier ( 1957) 25 Description of Cold War feeling of competition with USSR, impressions of Soviet people and society 26 Work on Shagan and Kearsarge ( JVE, 1988- 89), involvement with Soviet scientists, designing a containment plan for the tests 31 Talks about continuing involvement with the CEP, DIA escort training, early tests and continued development of containment 35 Comments on changing complexity of tests over time ( example: Star Wars) 37 Discusses tests important to containment: Baneberry ( 1970), Hupmobile ( 1968), and work in containment group 39 Comments on safety in testing 41 Talks about most difficult times in career: promotions, family life, Baneberry 43 Details factors in Baneberry venting 45 Talks about best times in life: working with Jack House to bring LANL and LLNL together on containment ( 1980s), the excitement of working at the NTS ( 1960s), influence of Ph. D. advisor Charlie Nash 47 Conclusion: importance of preserving containment work for the future 48 UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 1 Interview with Clifford W. Olsen September 20, 2004 in Las Vegas, NV Conducted by Joan Leavitt [ 00: 00: 00] Begin Track 2, Disc 1. Joan Leavitt: OK, if you could just kind of give me some basic background, personal background, and kind of leading up to getting to the lab. I guess it was the Livermore lab. Cliff Olsen: I suppose the place to start would be college. I was at the University of California in Davis from my junior year on through graduate school. I got my bachelor’s in chemistry in ’ 57 and then went on to graduate school. And my graduate advisor, Charlie Nash, who is now professor emeritus at Davis, had been doing some work within a very fledgling Livermore laboratory, so he knew some people down there and managed to get some funding for me to do graduate work. The laboratory didn’t fund me but they provided some equipment that I used in my graduate research. Through that, I got to know some people down here, and then I started working on one particular special project in 1961. Then when I got my doctorate in 1962, I went to the lab full time. I worked for about two years in N Division, which was neutronics. In particular, pulsed reactors is what I worked on. It was a way of getting a radiation pulse without a bomb. We used that to irradiate electronics components in stuff. And then N Division went away for administrative reasons and I moved to L Division in 1964, I guess. Yes, in late ’ 64. Jim Carothers was the division leader then, and that’s when I went full time in the normal nuclear testing. N Division had some stuff at the test site, but it was in a sort of out of the way area and wasn’t part of the mainstream testing. N- Division was Neutronics; we ran several reactors, pulsed and static. It was disbanded in 1964- 65. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 2 Now, were you part of Pike? Is that when there was a Testing Evaluation Panel? Yes, the TEP preceded that. Let’s see. The TEP started in, what, ’ 64? Right after Eagle, which would’ve been ’ 64. Yes,, that would be ’ 64. The TEP was kind of funny. It was an administrative thing primarily. The laboratories were represented by people like test group directors and not containment. It would actually review hardware and things like that, and sometimes even suggest changes to hardware, which the CEP [ Containment Evaluation Panel] never did. Now this was the precursor to the Containment Evaluation Panel, wasn’t it? Yes. Now were they concerned about containment or radiation problems with the TEP? They were, but not in the sense of the CEP. During that period, a little bit of radiation leakage, especially if it didn’t get offsite, wasn’t viewed with a whole lot of alarm. And it was pretty much almost accommodated. One of the major things you didn’t want to do was have radiation fog film on the diagnostics trailers because nearly all of the device diagnostics information was on oscilloscope camera film. So instead of trying to keep it underground, we’d put lead foil over film holders to shield it. One of the main leakage sources at the time were diagnostic cables, and instead of trying to block the cables as we do now, or did, they would let it come all the way up to essentially the wall of the trailer and where the connector was, they’d make that a gas- tight connector, so you could allow radioactive gas to come all the way up to the outside of the trailer but not go on in. Oh my goodness. And did that succeed for the most part, keeping the film from getting—? UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 3 Yes, it worked quite well except in a few cases where we actually had a big failure, like [ 00: 05: 00] Baneberry. There were a few cases when you had a dynamic vent and there was a big cloud and you’d lose virtually all of the data; at least what was on photographic film. And I bet that didn’t make the higher- ups very happy. No. No, it didn’t. They really wanted to get something for their money. Yes. Which is why Baneberry was such a millstone, in a way, and also a milestone. We lost a lot of device data and people were very upset so they stopped testing for six or seven months, did a big investigation, made containment a much more important part of the whole system and reconstituted the TEP as the CEP. The first few meetings of the CEP were kind of like the TEP because they didn’t know what else to do and those were the people they had. But they rapidly got people who were more interested in phenomenology than in getting the event off. They had geologists: Bill Twenhofel from the USGS [ United States Geological Survey]. They had hydrologists from DRI [ Desert Research Institute], whose names I should remember: George Maxey from DIR in Reno. And some other consultants who were more interested, as I said, in phenomenology and keeping things underground than in simply keeping the schedule going. You know, if you can do a little bit about containment without causing us too much trouble, it’s kind of like insurance. Yes. Well, the containment has been kind of developed through the years. I was interested that this also seemed to be an exercise in having the two labs work together; in the plan presented and then there being a lot of questions to see if the details had been taken care of. Yes. That was really kind of later on, in a way. Livermore was a little bit ahead and got interested in containment because we were doing line- of- sight- to- the- surface shots for the DNA UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 4 [ Defense Nuclear Agency] roughly after Baneberry. Actually, before Baneberry also, we did effects type tests, as opposed to device development. Events such as TEE and PACKARD. What is DNA? Defense Nuclear Agency. They’re now DTRA [ Defense Threat Reduction Agency]. They started out as DASA, Defense Atomic Support Agency, and then they went to be DNA, Defense Nuclear Agency. Well, what’s the difference between them and any other agencies? They’re just part of the DoD [ Department of Defense] instead of Department of Energy [ DOE], so they’re military. They were primarily interested in nuclear effects rather than design or that kind of thing. So that’s why they would be interested in containment? Yes. That seemed to be kind of a step— let’s see, yes, it seemed like that was along the way. I took note when I was reading Caging the Dragon that there were certain tests that seemed to be learning points, learning curves? Yes. You know, like for example, I think Red Hot and Double Play, you know. Yes. Now were you part of that at all? Only peripherally. Those were DNA shots. Well, DASA at the time. OK, because on that one, according to the book, they began to involve General Atomic and RAND people to help with different calculations. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 5 Yes. The DoD people had a lot more contract support than the AEC [ Atomic Energy Commission] laboratories did. We mostly did our own. We would get some contractor support, but DoD got a lot of it. They had RAND, a little later on s- cubed, Pac Tech, a whole bunch of them if you go through it. Now this is all again precursor to containment but still kind of concerned about film data. What kind of containment were they thinking about? [ 00: 10: 00] The DoD wasn’t so much, because the DoD basically on most of their tests used the device as simply an energy source. You know, they didn’t care about device diagnostics; particularly they were looking at effects, so they didn’t care so much about that. So what effects were they looking for, then? On humans? On animals? Was it that kind of effects? There were some of the early things, you know, the early atmospheric stuff, but in the underground things they were looking at a couple of things. One was ground shock and what that did to things. The other is that they tried to simulate essentially an atmospheric test, only do it underground. You’ve probably seen pictures of these monster line- of- sight pipes with a lot of exposure stations in them. They would put everything from a complete reentry vehicle to a lot of electronic components and all kinds of things and expose them to different levels of radiation and so forth. They were wanting to keep those samples intact, so that was their interest in containment. It wasn’t as much containment per se as it was sample protection. But of course, if you had a containment problem, then it had gone past the samples, so it was sort of automatic that they were interested in containment because if there were a breach in containment, it would’ve done them in along the way. Well, even defining containment, it seems like that that kind of changed through the years. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 6 Oh, it did. So at the beginning it was, don’t let the radiation get too far, is that what that was? Yes. There wasn’t even really an official definition of containment until the CEP charter. There was kind of a working definition. After Baneberry. Yes. Well, it was before Baneberry. As I was going to say, we had a containment group at Livermore that was formed after Diluted Waters, which was about ’ 65 or so, ’ 65, ’ 66. And we were working on various things there. We had— Now you were a containment scientist on that, on Diluted Waters, is that—? No, Diluted Waters was another DoD event in Frenchman Flat. No, we didn’t have true containment scientists until after Baneberry. OK. Because that’s probably a brand new field, then, wasn’t it? Yes. As I said, we had a containment group but we didn’t have much stature. So how do you become a containment scientist? Great question. Do you have to almost raise your own and train them? Yes, you do. We had containment scientists. The best ones were ones who had kind of grown up through some other part of testing, usually either geology or reaction history; the device diagnostics kind of thing where you understood something about how the device worked, the diagnostics that were done, why you had cables coming up to the surface, what you were trying to do in a given test. We had containment scientists who were very capable, men and women who were chemists, physicists, geophysicists, geologists, computational modelers. Quite an array. It’s a very multidisciplinary kind of thing. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 7 Now this panel acts as an advisory to the manager? Yes, the CEP is appointed by and reports to the manager. The laboratories will nominate people as their representatives but they have to be approved by the manager. And there are some independents on the panel who don’t represent anybody except their own expertise. They were generally recommended by the chairman or could be by the manager directly. Well, I was really interested that one of the key secrets to the panel being able to work was a certain integrity. Very much. And I’m really interested in your explanation of that because, you know, to have confidence in what you were doing, there’s certain things that I think are part of the record; that it [ 00: 15: 00] will be comforting to understand that. Maybe you would like to just kind of explain anything along the lines of how it had integrity and how it was something that was not just pencil- whipping. Yes. The panel, as I said, when it was reconstituted, it became the CEP after Baneberry and replaced the Test Evaluation Panel, brought in outsiders, as I mentioned; the USGS and DRI and others. So it wasn’t quite the ingrown good- old- boys thing that the TEP tended to be; it was more open in that sense. And we also kept verbatim transcripts, which was not done during the TEP. Do you know if those are declassified yet, if they’ve been declassified? Oh, no, they’re all S/ RD [ Secret/ Restricted Data]. There have been pieces that have been declassified that people have wanted, but basically they’re all SR/ D. The panel went through several stages. The first year or so, we had several chairmen, and then Jim Carothers took over at the eleventh meeting, roughly a year after Baneberry. Jim was a very interesting guy. Dead now, unfortunately, fairly recently; within the last two years. But Jim UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 8 had a way of letting the panel members essentially do what they wanted and go off on some pretty big tangents. But kept things under control. He did not have a vote. All he did was summarize the panel members’ statements. He moderated it, then? Yes. But he wrote the recommendation to the manager as to whether or not the test that had been considered by the panel should go ahead or not. Now how often did the panel meet? It was really at the behest of the laboratories of when they wanted to do an event. There was enough testing during the sixties that we met almost once a month— sometimes a little more than that— and we’d consider maybe three or four events at one meeting. After Baneberry, when the testing level went down, we still continued to meet almost once a month and we might consider one or two events instead of three or four. But until testing was winding down in the early nineties, we met roughly once a month. How long did it take to do one of those? Was it several hours or it was all day? Typically an event would take half a day. Some of them would take occasionally as short as an hour, a little more, if it were very simple. A complex event like a long line- of- sight event or one of the DoD big tunnel events could take a full day and sometimes more. Well, I understand that it could almost be as big a process to get it through the CEP panel as it was to design it in the first place. I don’t think it was quite that much but it probably seemed like it to the people who had to get it through the panel. And I was on both sides. I presented a number of events as well as sitting on the panel. Well actually I’m still officially on the panel but I don’t represent Livermore anymore. But I represented Livermore for close to twenty years as the senior member. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 9 You were there for a long time. Yes. Part of the integrity thing was that the presenting laboratory didn’t want to get up there and have something thrown in their face: why didn’t you think of this? So the presenting laboratory would work very diligently to make sure they didn’t overlook something. [ 00: 20: 00] They’d have a pre- meeting. Oh, yes. At least one, usually two or three. Pre- CEP? Yes. Was that just practice at their own lab? The last one was essentially a dry run. It was practice for the CEP. The earlier ones were technical review kinds of things. Wow, they really took that seriously, didn’t they? Oh, yes. Oh, yes, we did. Practicing up for it and trying to cover all the loopholes before they actually went before the official body. Yes. And we would send copies of the prospectus. Every event had a prospectus, and we would send copies to the other laboratory— well, in fact, to all of the CEP members, as well as the other laboratories. Between Livermore and Los Alamos, we would exchange questions and comments, which was very good for several reasons. One is it would point out things in the prospectus that might even just be a typo, but if people read through a document and see a lot of typos, they kind of get this mindset of, Gee, was this done carefully or not? And also if you got a question back from Los Alamos, say, that said, We’re not quite sure what you mean by UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 10 this. Please explain it, you could be pretty certain that that same question would be asked at the CEP. So it gave you a chance to prepare so that you had your ducks in order, too. Now was this almost an exercise in helping to overcome some of the competition of these two labs with each other? Later on it was. There was a time in the late seventies that there was considerable rancor between the two labs; the panel members on both sides at the time were pretty strong- willed and not necessarily cooperative. Yes, there’s some unnamed leaders of each lab that gave them some problems. Yes. I could give you some names but there’s probably no point in it. And things got pretty nasty on occasion where it was not cooperative. It was torpedo management. Were you present for any of this? Oh, all of it, yes. So did you feel like some of the rancoring was more pettiness than it was sincere differences, then? Yes, a lot of it was. It was kind of one- upsmanship; in some cases, really petty. That started to fade away a little bit, partly because of the chairman. But as I said, he didn’t like to get in to making it look as though he was trying to control panel members or impress any member more than anybody else. So he gave the panel members quite a bit of latitude, but he did a little bit behind the scenes. What really, and I think this is true, what really got it straightened out and had us working cooperatively was when I became the associate program leader for containment evaluation, which meant all of the CEP stuff at Livermore. I got together with Jack House, who was the program manager in Los Alamos for containment, and we got along pretty well personally. We worked very difficult problems in the early eighties, getting all of this stuff UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 11 straightened out and getting people to cooperate. So by ’ 84 or so, Jack and I had things working in a pretty friendly fashion. And for a while we even sent people, not just a copy of the prospectus but people back and forth to pre- CEP meetings and things like that. You mean you have natural political talent, is that what you’re saying? Well, I don’t know about that; I don’t consider myself a politician. Well, you know, sometimes political talent is getting people with diverse opinions to come to a middle ground. I can’t help it, to think about this, if it was important for this to be almost in place with regard to helping to bring the Soviet Union [ USSR] and the United States together, to help resolve a gap, you know, former enemies, rancor, whatever, and can we find a middle ground, can we come together, can we work together? Sure. That’s true. [ 00: 25: 00] And it’s just an idea that’s forming in my mind that maybe some of the things that were learned in getting along with two very, very different laboratories may have been helpful. I don’t know. Have you ever thought about that? Not in that way, no, but you know, you have a point. That there has to be kind of a certain principles of cooperation, of unity, agreement, differences that can transfer over to diplomacy. I don’t know. That’s been on my mind a lot. Yes, it’s not a bad thought. But that was one thing I noticed in the book and it talked a little bit about that, and I just thought that competition of the laboratories, coming together for a purpose higher than their egos, you know. That’s, I think, a really marvelous thing about the Containment Evaluation Panel. Yes. One other thing. Toward the end of the eighties when budgets in particular— well, from the middle eighties. budgets had always been a problem but from the middle eighties on it got really UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 12 tight— there were a lot of political pressures back and forth, and there was pressure on the laboratories to try and do things the same. Not so much the same as to try and minimize. [ The questions was raised] Why do you do it that way and you do it that way? Can you do it more or less the same and then we can save some money so we don’t have to support two separate infrastructures? So there was pressure there on the laboratories. It was not because of anybody doing anything wrong or ego. It was just a— Well, yes, it seemed like one used drills and the other one used another method, and it would be more efficient if they agreed on using certain similarity things. Yes. And there were some fairly logical reasons why they developed the way they did. But because of that, then we tried to get back together basically to save money, and that’s when around 1990 or so, the JTO, the Joint Test Organization, came about just because of that, to try to simplify and coordinate things on the test site. Now was that an agreement between the labs? It was an agreement between the labs but it was essentially a mandate from DOE saying, You will. OK. We are going to be more efficient here. Up till that time, they’d had more freedom with budgeting and everything else. More autonomous. Now there seemed like there was also kind of room for learning. Oh, yes. You know, room for making some mistakes and not quickly firing people for things. Yes. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 13 Has that attitude changed through the years? Because it seems like, you know, if you’re too quick to pass blame and not give them that little bit of learning time, that you can eliminate an awful lot of people. Yes. The test programs, especially in the early part of the sixties were probably the best example, but it went further on. There was an awful lot going on and you couldn’t— unless there was some horrendous screw- up, which was rare— there wasn’t much point in trying to point blame. It was much more productive to go ahead than to look back. You’d say, Yes, we have a lesson learned here. Now let’s move on. And that’s the way it was. The whole thing in the test program in the sixties; very positive, very can- do, very let’s do the best we can, do whatever it takes to get it done, and both labs were pretty much that way. Did it stay that way or has there become more rancor, more blaming through the years? Well, there— Maybe that’s not— that might not be a fair question. Not really. Like I said, there was that period in the CEP, but that didn’t really cover all of the test program either. The blaming probably came more from the outside, wasn’t it? Not really from the inside. Yes, there was finger- pointing and, Do we really need to do this? But like with some of them, when there was some escaping, like there was one that went to [ 00: 30: 00] Mexico; Pike went to Mexico. Pike, yes. But it seemed like even when there were escapes, you know, inside the organization there was more problem- solving. Oh, yeah. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 14 OK, how can we prevent this, you know. I noticed that when— one of the things, cultural differences between the Russians and the Americans, was that the Russians were very, very quick to find fault, blame, and to humiliate. Oh. Yes. They were very much that way. And they were very, very surprised that Americans were more problem- solving. That was a stark contrast in cultures. The Communist culture, the American culture. Did you see any of that, too? Not a lot. A bit. It was more secondhand than direct observation. There were a few things when I was in Semipalatinsk where we kind of heard or inferred that, Gee, you know, why haven’t we seen him lately? But we weren’t privy to why somebody was no longer around and we didn’t know if it’s because he had been planning on leaving anyway or if he made somebody unhappy. Oh, you’re saying that there was kind of a sudden disappearance, as if someone made someone higher up unhappy and was— Yes. But we never knew. All we had was kind of a secondhand of, Gee, have you seen So- and- so lately? And even that was rare. I only personally know of one instance like that and I don’t even remember a name. But the Soviets, as you said earlier, tended to be very secretive about things, but they were almost to the point of being comical except they didn’t look at it that way. One of the stories— I wasn’t there at the time— in the beginning of our group that went to Semipalatinsk, they had us in what they called the hotel, which was not a bad two- story building, at least for them it wasn’t bad. They tried to spruce it up and they put in wallpaper that looked like it was thirty years old, if not more, and they’d done a little painting and all that. Somebody mentioned in one of the closed meetings that they couldn’t get the darn window open; it was sealed with paint. A couple of days later, the window was opened. None of us, none of the UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 15 Americans, had said anything to them, and of course they weren’t at the meeting, but somehow they had heard that this window wouldn’t open, and it just miraculously suddenly would open. Well, it sounds like they knew what was going on. They had ears on the walls, huh? Yes. Exactly. And the hotels that they put us in, in Moscow when we were going in and out, we were always next to an elevator because those were the rooms that probably had been pre- bugged. Also at that time, and I think this was in eventually all of the hotels in Russia, or the Soviet Union, you didn’t keep the key to your room and it was rarely at the front desk. At the top of the stairs or the elevator, there was usually some grumpy- looking little old lady who sat at a desk and gave you your key when you came in. She could see, usually she could see, everybody who came in, knew which room they went into, and was— Don’t keep records. It was just all— Yes. So it was a funny kind way, very obvious but still at the same time subtle way, of keeping track of things. And they were obsessed with that kind of thing. At the Soviet test site, it was interesting. There were really three different groups. Semipalatinsk actually, you probably know, is a big city. Semipalatinsk was simply not another post office zone; in fact it was their test site, quite a ways away from the city. And the main thing there was in fact [ 00: 35: 00] a military base. They had troops out and you’d see them marching in the mornings and all this stuff, a lot of them very young kids. There were a few real soldiers, but a lot of them were very young and kind of looking around. But they were there and they were across the fence. Then there was the group that we dealt with in a technical sense. And then probably the most interesting and the smallest group were the interpreters, and the interpreters were mostly senior students. I don’t mean necessarily senior class, but higher up students from the University of Moscow who knew UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 16 English. They were there to be interpreters, and they apparently had not been told, you know, You will not discuss politics. So they were very friendly. Yes, they’d go for walks with us in the evening and they were fairly candid. Probably the thing they were most candid about, at least a couple of them, is they didn’t like being hauled away from their studies and sent out here to this godforsaken place. They weren’t too happy to be there in Kazakhstan. No. Kazakhstan was not prestigious, huh? No, not really. Well, do you remember anything else that they told you about what life was like for them at that time? They didn’t go into a lot of it in that sense, but probably if anything they were more interested in what we could tell them. But the students, which they mostly were, were generally fairly happy. You know, that’s a nice time of life. They didn’t like in general being hauled off, but because they were where they were, they were going to be in the upper level of Soviet society, and they were probably a little happier than you might have thought they would be. Moscow was the dirtiest place I ever saw in my life. Really. Did you get to go along the back streets? I know there’s some parts that was fancier than others. No, not much. When we went in, I was with two other guys and we spent two nights in Moscow before we went on to Semey [ Semipalatinsk]— a night and a half because we left very early in the morning to go out. Have you seen pictures of the monster radio tower in Moscow? It’s been UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 17 there for quite a while. It’s just a huge tower. It looks something like the tower downtown; the Stratosphere here in Las Vegas. It had television and radio, and they were very sensitive about it. Ordinary tourists, and there weren’t many of them then, but ordinary tourists usually couldn’t even get very close to it. We went out walking late one afternoon or early evening, and got fairly close to it. I think Willy Cooper may even have taken a picture, but I’m not sure. We left the hotel and when we— oh, if I can re