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Chat with Chic A Report from Washington June 7, 1985 t By U.S. Senator Chic Hecht There are a couple of good reasons why we have been able to get the Soviets to the bargaining table in Geneva. One of them is the MX missile and the other is SDI, the President's "Strategic Defense Initiative", a comprehensive, long-term research and development program that will lead to the eventual basing of a nuclear ballistic missile-defense system in outer space. You've heard a lot about the MX and you'll be hearing as much about SDI. In remarks I entered into the Congressional Record not long ago., I pointed out that SDI represents a clear solution to the long held desire of the American people for a dramatic decrease in superpower reliance on offensive nuclear arms. Most significant and really the ultimate goal of us all, will be the enhancement of global security by permanently eliminating the threat of strategic nuclear missiles. In my opinion, no single act by this, or any other administration has done more to bring the Soviets to the bargaining table, as they now are in Geneva, than the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative. Indeed, without obvious Soviet recognition that the United States is the only country capable enough to develop the SDI system, they would not presently be so willing to talk. This is reason enough why we should not gut our SDI program as some are trying to do. I continually am amazed that those who are opposed to SDI overlook the fact that the Soviet Union has been pursuing advanced space defensive technologies of their own. Such Soviet develop-ment include directed energy research for high-energy lasers and the Chat with Chic, page 2 deployment of their own anti-satellite capability which at this very moment orbits the earth. It is clear to me that arguments that the President alone seeks to destabilize the nuclear balance or is moving toward the first militariza-tion of space are hollow. And now for the MX. Whether or not we should continue production of this vital weapon seems to be a never ending issue before Congress. I think the time has come when we should stop this folly of having to, year after year, address the question of whether or not we have the MX. The simple fact is that we absolutely must have this weapon to assure the modernization of our strategic nuclear forces and ensure that the Soviets will continue to seriously negotiate arms reduction. Without the MX system, we will have given in to the Soviets, abrogated our negotiating position in Geneva and exposed ourselves to Russia's ever increasing and unprecedented nuclear escalation. As has been the case in the past, arms control negotiations are heavily influenced by ongoing defense programs and MX has been a major reason for renewed talks. What the Russians understand best is strength, or force. If they think they are stronger than us, there is no need for them to.' talk with us. Conversely, if they believe we hold an upper hand, they are more than willing to sit down with us, as is the case in Geneva, and "negotiate". We cannot afford to take a back seat to the Soviets in any defense related area, much less in our strategic forces. The MX and SDI insure that we don't.