Interview with Edward Bonfoy Giller, April 19, 2006

Nevada Test Site Oral History Project University of Nevada, Las Vegas Interview with Edward B. Giller, Jr. April 19, 2006 Albuquerque, New Mexico Interview Conducted By Mary Palevsky © 2007 by UNLV Libraries Oral history is a method of collecting historical information through recorded interviews conducted by an interviewer/ researcher with an interviewee/ narrator who possesses firsthand knowledge of historically significant events. The goal is to create an archive which adds relevant material to the existing historical record. Oral history recordings and transcripts are primary source material and do not represent the final, verified, or complete narrative of the events under discussion. Rather, oral history is a spoken remembrance or dialogue, reflecting the interviewee’s memories, points of view and personal opinions about events in response to the interviewer’s specific questions. Oral history interviews document each interviewee’s personal engagement with the history in question. They are unique records, reflecting the particular meaning the interviewee draws from her/ his individual life experience. Produced by: The Nevada Test Site Oral History Project Departments of History and Sociology University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 89154- 5020 Director and Editor Mary Palevsky Principal Investigators Robert Futrell, Dept. of Sociology Andrew Kirk, Dept. of History The material in the Nevada Test Site Oral History Project archive is based upon work supported by the U. S. Dept. of Energy under award number DEFG52- 03NV99203 and the U. S. Dept. of Education under award number P116Z040093. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in these recordings and transcripts are those of project participants— oral history interviewees and/ or oral history interviewers— and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U. S. Department of Energy or the U. S. Department of Education. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 1 Interview with Edward Giller April 19, 2006 Conducted by Mary Palevsky Table of Contents Introduction: joins Army Air Corps as pilot trainee ( September 1941) and thoughts on Pearl Harbor and advent of World War II in general 1 Stationed in occupied Germany at end of World War II ( 1945), thoughts on atomic bomb and Japan 2 Impressions of post- war Germany 3 Thoughts on atomic bomb, how it would affect policy and change war, and how it affected weapons effects testing by AFSWP 4 AFSWP interaction with national laboratory scientists on weapons effects tests, custody of weapons, creation of DoD, relation of effects tests to war planning, etc. 8 Transfers to AEC as flag officer ( 1967) and description of tasks at DMA 11 Role of laboratories in “ selling” weapons to DoD, encouragement of competition between labs in weapons development, and development phases 14 Discusses various directors of LANL 17 Talks about policy decisions made concerning weapons use 18 Cannikin ( 1971) and its relation to Safeguard, creation of Polaris, and reliability testing of weapons 21 Military view on necessity of “ scenario planning” 23 Baneberry ( 1970) and learning containment 25 Comparison of LANL and LLNL re: ideas for and production of weapons, weapons still in the stockpile, weapons that have “ faded off into history,” and the current technical challenge of stockpile safety and reliability 27 Future of nuclear weapons in the U. S. armed forces 31 Conclusion: retires from USAF ( 1972), becomes Assistant General Manager for National Security ( AEC), and later arms control negotiator for the JCS 32 UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 1 Interview with Edward B. Giller April 19, 2006 in Albuquerque, New Mexico Conducted by Mary Palevsky [ 00: 00: 00] Begin Track 2, Disc 1. Mary Palevsky: Thank you so much for meeting with me again, and as I said, I just wanted to pick up a couple of threads to fill out the story from last time, a year ago, which was where you were when Pearl Harbor happened and what you thought, and then what you had to do. Edward Giller: Well, I had joined the Army Air Corps as a pilot trainee in September of ’ 41, end of September. I was sent to Stamford, a cow town in Texas, which is not too far east of where we are here, where there was a training field for primary, that is, the first stage of flight training, flying Stearmans. I had eighty hours previous to this, so I had no trouble flying the airplane. I remember Sunday morning, laying in my bunk, which was a day off, when the radio came on about Pearl Harbor. We hadn’t been particularly following the Japanese aspect. For the year or two previous, one had seen a lot of RKO Pathé News images of England and all of the background that went with that; most of us accepted that there’d be a war, in a general sense, probably with the Germans. Although there was some talk of the Japanese, it was still primarily a European- type war we thought would come to pass. When Pearl Harbor was bombed, the Japanese, mainly what it did was point out there was another front, the South Pacific front, that would have to be fought. But speaking frankly, we were twenty, twenty- two- year- olds, and our basic direction is toward learning to fly this airplane, and the structure of exercises, line up, do this, go fly, take your courses; doesn’t leave a lot of time for introspection. At that age, most of us weren’t doing introspection anyway. So in a sense, it just made concrete the fact we were UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 2 going to war and as a pilot we expected to go somewhere. So it’s a short story but that’s sort of how it was at that time. That’s exactly what I wanted to know. Now fast- forward, because you talked to me a lot about your combat. You said last time that you had thought maybe you would be sent to Japan but you weren’t. Well, when the war ended in Germany, there was uncertainty what anybody would do; the war in Japan was going on, so everybody said, maybe we’ll go. Somebody’s going to go. But since there were so many groups in the Eighth Air Force, bombers and fighter groups, it was unknown and just speculation, so we were waiting after the war ended to see what was going to happen; by the throw of the dice, cards, our group ended up in the occupation of Germany. Other groups who went back to the States to get ready to go to the Pacific didn’t make it because the war ended over there. So there was a whole series of movements among the individual groups toward the South Pacific, which I don’t know if any of the groups that left England ever made it to the Pacific in time before the war ended. So where did you hear about the atomic bombs and then finally the— In the news in England. Even though I was an engineer, not a physicist, I really didn’t have a very good idea except it was big. The only thing we knew is what we heard on the news. There was just no other intelligence, even classified intelligence coming into the remnants of the World War II bunch in England. So it was a big bomb, basically. That’s right, just a hell of a big bomb is about all we could say; we weren’t in the bombing business, we were in the fighter business, so that made it even a little more remote from our main interest. But the war was over. We were having fun. We survived. We were goofing off. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 3 And so you were in England at the time, you say? [ 00: 05: 00] Oh, yes. See, the war ended, we were in England, and in July we moved the group— I’m sorry, you’re right— we moved the group to Kaufbeuren, Germany, so it was in Germany. My time frame was wrong. It was in Germany that we heard about it. So we were even further away from any news sources. Commercial shortwave [ radio] wasn’t in place in those days like it is now. We got the Stars and Stripes and that’s about it. ( It was a newspaper.) Yes, I know. So one other question about that that I don’t think we talked about, just because I’m curious about it, what were your impressions of Germany? I see pictures, newsreels of utter destruction of the landscape and the cities. Is that pretty much how it was? Yeah. Before we moved to Germany, two or three of us said let’s go see what’s over there. Well, we fly to Munich and land at an airfield right outside of Munich. The GIs come out to greet us. The sergeant comes out in a Jeep. It has a platform on the back. Throws back the blanket and says, Would you like some of these guns? You want to buy these cameras? Here’s the prices. It’s a traveling PX [ post exchange], you might call it. So I bought a camera there and one gun, a handgun. And then we found a Canadian that had a big car, so we all went driving around Munich, which I have 16- millimeter movies of. I was taking movies then. And you’d drive through the streets of Munich one car wide. You’d drive by the opera in Munich and it’s sort of in pretty sad shape, and you went by the BMW factory and everything’s all fallen in. So it was, the part of Munich that we went through, you had to be able to drive through it, was pretty just blown up, you know, fallen down. And that was true of the other cities we could see when we flew over them at lower altitudes. But that’s the only city I actually toured, you might say, at that time. We were going down to an autobahn where we had UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 4 strafed a lot of airplanes, and so I have pictures of us standing in front of these airplanes we strafed, and this is where I got my hit in the shoulder with a bullet, when I was doing that. But after we moved to Kaufbeuren, we traveled southern Germany. We were in Bavaria, so we traveled there and we went down into Switzerland to see the countryside, not to see blown- up cities. But Bavaria did not have the destruction that the big industrial cities— Munich had some, but I mean the countryside in Bavaria was fairly untouched. That’s why the airfield where we were had never been bombed. It was a little primary field and just grass, no runways. But I drove my antique car to Antwerp and I had to go up through Germany to get there, so I saw a lot of it then. The Americans bombed the bridges. Now the autobahns are as good as our interstates. And you come to a bridge across a little river or ravine, they blew the bridge, so you’d drive along and all of a sudden you had to pull off to the right, go down the hill, across a little makeshift bridge, back up the hill, get back on the autobahn again. And you’d fly along and you’d see bridge after bridge blown. Well, those were the little two pieces that I wanted to get of that war narrative. So let me go back over here. You said in the interview from last year something about [ Henry Harley] Hap Arnold and your phrase was something like the impact of science and engineering on equipment tactics, et cetera, and before we turned on, you were talking about the way this mysterious new powerful weapon was unknown and to what degree was it going to change the way people did war, so I wonder if you could talk a little bit about that and then maybe we can— I don’t know. Well, when the news of the defeat of Japan due to the bombings came to us through the Stars and Stripes and the Armed Forces Radio, we had only a small picture [ 00: 10: 00] of what was being said about it. Most of it was just factual. Therefore, we were not really exposed to, what does this mean? I mean we were still fighter pilots, you know, we’re UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 5 imbedded in an organization doing something and had not been worrying about policy. We read all about policy ten years later. So there really wasn’t much, I don’t remember, very much discussion about, what does this mean to the military, to world politics, to military—? That came a lot later, even after I got out of graduate school almost. And when it did come, what were the kinds of things that— you obviously— not obviously, but this— because of the work that you’ve done, this new reality comes into your consciousness in phases, I guess, when you begin to understand the weapon better and then you begin to understand what people are thinking about in terms of the weapon. Well, until I actually ended up with the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project [ AFSWP] which was the nuclear business, I was really enmeshed in graduate school. Anybody that’s ever worked on a doctorate knows what that means. You are focused. So I do not recall in any way very much thought process or discussions about the bigger picture of realizing they’re nuclear weapons. We just knew it existed. And I came into AFSWP with a degree in chem[ ical] engineering which meant technical, an engineering degree, and engineers are problem solvers. I viewed my job, or at least it turned out as the way I did it, mostly inclined to solve problems that I got when I inherited this job in AFSWP, which was to find out what the bomb effects would be on military equipment and people, et cetera. So I approached it as a technical project, not particularly as a sociological or a broader picture. And you would read and hear more about that side, but that still was peripheral to the main thrust of my daily life in the Pentagon. That’s so interesting because I guess part of my bias, if you want to say, is when I read a lot of the stuff that came out of the Manhattan Project guys, not military people but people like [ J. Robert] Oppenheimer, you know, this weapon changes the very nature of war. We are not going to be able to be warriors in the same way that we were before. [ This] was some people’s UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 6 philosophy. And yet it seems that what the Cold War history tells us in certain sense is no, that’s not really true. The military systems as they existed absorbed these problems and figured out things that they’ve always figured out, which is what are these effects of these weapons and all those kinds of things. Even though the senior people, I presume in the Air Force, planners would have thought a little bit more about the bigger picture. I’m still in the trenches, as far as I’m concerned, at AFSWP, solving technical operational engineering problems to carry out these effects tests; so most of my debates had to do with how to do it, what to do, almost independent of whether it’s ever going to be used, in a sense. We had to assume it was going to be, but we had to find out as much as we could for the military in order to write a handbook, the Handbook of the Effects of Atomic Weapons, which was one of them. Then there’s the military version of that. And so our job was to put information in front of the services to use as they saw fit. [ Note: Super Effects Handbook, 1953 and Capabilities of Atomic Weapons, 1955 were classified documents for the military] Now we sometimes had individual thoughts about whether that made sense or didn’t make sense, when we found out there was an awful lot of ignorance, or not ignorance but just— well, I suppose it’s ignorance, about what this thing would do technically, which is natural. I mean it’s a whole new subject. And so part of our job was to help the services find tests that would provide information. We didn’t have much to do with— it’s just here’s how you use it or you shouldn’t use it or should use it, things like that. So that’s what’s behind all these kinds of weapons effects tests that then develop over time to become more and more sophisticated. Well, it’s on- the- job learning. AFSWP had its own tests we thought should be done, mostly measuring, being sure that measurements were made of what came out of the bomb when it went UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 7 [ 00: 15: 00] off. That’s what’s going to hit somebody or a tank or something. The services would propose: we want to learn about this and this. And this and we’ll do it by putting a tank, a Jeep, or a person— not put people but dummies and things like that, at different distances, that meaning different levels of damage flux. And so we started out, all of us, with some odd ideas of what would happen. Then after the first test, oh, that’s, you know. And so the tests became a little more useful, and if I use the word “ sophisticated” I’m going to hear from all my friends at Los Alamos [ National Laboratory, LANL] that nothing was sophisticated. But be that as it may, there’s a bunch of soldiers in the trenches and airborne in the air that really are pragmatic, you know, I want to see it— a few times there were some surprises. So the idea was to— never think of it this way, but it was to get ourselves educated on what we’d inherited, whether we wanted it or not, the military systems. That’s different than the development of one set of weapons after another as they grew in yield and shrunk in size. That’s another story. In AFSWP we were not concerned with that so much, but it was getting the understanding so we could write down the effects of atomic energy on all aspects of the military, not the policy levels but the technical levels. So on the battlefield, if these weapons are used, this is the kind of thing that will happen. Yes. Now before I turned on the machine, you said something about these four phases, one, two three— is this related to this or is this—? No, this is not related to this. I learned more about that when I ended up in AEC [ U. S. Atomic Energy Commission] headquarters sometime later. In fact, that system had not been generated in the fifties, even in the sixties. You want to talk about this? UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 8 Yes. I just want to make sure that if there’s anything else, because now I have a better understanding of the effects tests. But at this point, I guess one other follow- up on that is, and you touched on it, I think, before, but to what extent now are you interacting with the lab scientists on these things? Not so much in this technical sense. We interacted with the labs on what were they going to test; next, and we wanted to have a test that we could have a pretty good idea it’s going to work, it’s going to be about this size, because if it doesn’t work or we have big surprises in output, then all our experiments are no good. And so we were interested in a series, within a series, which one would most suit our needs, not just one, maybe a couple of them. And that was so we could design our instrumentation and lay out our test program and what have you. Another part of AFSWP dealt with, what were the developments going on in the labs? What were they up to next in terms of the next weapon, regardless of what the effects were? And you may have come across it, but in that particular time frame, AFSWP had custody of the weapons. The services did not. By law. They’re in the law. So if you wanted to use one, it had to come through Headquarters AFSWP in order to get it to the service. We had to release the bombs from Manzano Mountain up here [ AFSW Command Manzano Base, New Mexico] or wherever they were at that time. There weren’t very many anywhere. And that was pretty clumsy, obviously. But we had to have a senior officer, not necessarily a general, on duty twenty- four hours a day in the Pentagon. And I used to sleep in the general’s office about every two months when my turn came, waiting for the telephone to ring to call up another telephone. Well, Congress changed that, I forget when exactly, and just got AFSWP out of the chain of command that way. So we had custody of the weapon. That was the idea. And it’s got to be in the history some— UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 9 [ 00: 20: 00] It does. But that’s really interesting because it speaks to my question, and this is where I don’t know the history, this kind of detail of the history well enough, because you have the Atomic Energy Act which says the Atomic Energy Commission is civilian, and so my understanding was— so where does AFSWP sit? It sits in between—? No, that Act created the Division of Military Application [ DMA] for the purpose of military applications, obviously. As a consequence of that, the Department of Defense [ DoD] created the Armed Forces Special Weapons Center [ Program] to be the interface between the two; we represented the three services, but limited primarily— well, not limited, but whatever there was between the three services as a group, the Department of Defense, I should say. And I’m trying to remember who the commanding general of AFSWP reported to. The Secretary of Defense. Did we have a Secretary of Defense then? That’s a piece of timing I can’t remember. I don’t know either. Right away, we didn’t have the Secretary of Defense, but when the Defense Department is created, I’m not sure. There was a time in which there was a SECDEF before there was a Department of Defense. We went from two services, the Army and Navy, to then a— Congress created a kind of Department of Defense. It was called the [ National] Military Establishment. I remember that part. [ N] ME— three letters. And then it went on to become the Department of Defense the next time the Congress got in the act. [ Original AFSWP charter, January 1947; revised charter July 1947; first SECDEF James Forrestal 9/ 17/ 1947; National Military Establishment created 9/ 18/ 1947; NME renamed Department of Defense 8/ 10/ 1949] UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 10 So there’s a transition which came about— that transition came about more with the fact that everybody was trying to get the Air Force as a stand- alone service. Now we have three of them. And people were always used to this Army and Navy, now you got a third, and whoever the president was, I think, decided that was enough. He wanted to have one guy running all of them. That’s the simple version of it. But that history is well written up somewhere. Right. But that’s interesting because I didn’t know that AFSWP actually had custody and then would have to— For a while, we went through a strange, as far as I was concerned, very clumsy means to get a weapon released to the Air Force to take and fly and use it. And then that changed. I think in the history that Byron [ Ristvet] wrote, I think he says it’s five years out. I’ll have to look [ See Defense Special Weapons Agency, 1947- 1997, www. dtra. mil.] It’s someplace in there. That’s interesting. We had a Development Division in AFSWP which interacted with the laboratories with the idea, what are you guys thinking about next, technically? What do you have planned for the future from a technical standpoint? What are you going to test? What’s the purpose of that bomb? And things like that. So an interface having to do with what they think they can do and what the services thought might be a good idea, whether they could do it or not, would be handled by another division of AFSWP which I was not in, therefore I didn’t follow it personally very closely. Now in the history of the military, and again forgive me if I’m being too vague but it’s because I have little understanding of these things that I ask these questions, this sounds like a new kind of UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 11 relationship with a fairly big civilian establishment as far as weapons development. I mean before this kind of bomb, obviously other places are developing bombs and civilian— Well, the services did their own. The Army and the Navy, all their bomb developments were done by their own laboratories and/ or civilian contractors. And they still do it today. But I’m saying, because it was nuclear science and that these guys had the expertise, I guess, you had to look to them to really develop these weapons at first, I would imagine. The military didn’t put any weapon expertise into the system. What the military at that time put into it was an interface that could be— the language could be understood between the people talking, between the scientists on the Hill [ Los Alamos] and the uniformed folks in the Pentagon. It really was a communication channel, I’ll look at it that way, where there’s a common language, but insofar as the services giving much technical input, really technical input to the labs, other than [ 00: 25: 00] critique, you know, occasionally individuals might have their own personal views, but not as a group. You have something from the other interview that I like where you said, the question was, is it going to change the fundamental kind of war we’re going to do, and wise old owls popping off about different things, but no one really knowing exactly how this whole thing was going to play out. I guess, in the early days, and that’s what you’re trying to figure out with these effects tests, at least, is what’s it going to be on the battlefield? Well, I think the services wanted to know what this thing could do for them and against them in a kind of a remote— not remote but an isolated technical sense. And then they had to decide, what does this mean to our formations, to our operational tactics, to the whole war planning world? And I personally didn’t get into much of that, and AFSWP didn’t either. We were a provider of UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 12 information but not have any major impact, contribution to I’ll call it operational planning on how to use it. Yes. So let’s hop forward, then, because that was the other area I wanted to ask you about, was when you went later, right, late sixties or earlier seventies as the flag officer at the AEC? I went in ’ 67. In ’ 67 to ’ 72. So that’s five years. Yeah. Well, then I got kicked upstairs for another five, so I was in a sense sitting on the same job except I had other things, like all of AEC security, arms control, technology transfer [ laughing]. OK. So just to get a better sense of, to start with, what that function of that officer within the AEC was at that historical period in time, what was the definition of what your tasks were there? Well, of course it started with the Atomic Energy Act with the Division of Military Application which was to watch out for the military application of the atomic energy as opposed to civilian power reactors. And so they created the Division of Military Application, and then they said it has to have a flag officer to run it. That was to give it some form of structure and a little bit of flag rank at the top to presume they’d be heard. They created this, I think, in the same Act, or later, the Military Liaison Commission, which was another interface between the AEC and the military. I can’t remember whether it’s in the Act or not. Anyway, the job of the DMA, the director of DMA, was to oversee all the things with the nuclear weapons, whether it was research, development, test, manufacturing, and destruction, and what have you; whereas other AEC divisions had physics and they had research reactors and material production, so there were several divisions in the AEC. And we had a commission, but we all we reported to a general manager, and then he reported to the Commission. Now when I arrived, it had been in existence since ’ 47 or so and I arrived quite a bit later. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 13 Twenty years. There had been several flag officers ahead of me, so there was a structure I walked into already running. It wasn’t as if I created it. And we had a division which followed the science, one which followed the manufacture, one which followed testing. Now what this meant mostly was that we tried to keep up on one hand what the labs were doing and planning to do, and the other side would be in contact with the Department of Defense to see what these individual activities might have an impact on anything or what would be required actually to have such an activity. So it [ 00: 30: 00] was in a sense a big liaison group between the laboratory production, the military use, the civilian world of control, which was the Commission. We were just pure managers. We didn’t contribute anything scientifically. If it was, it was just individual. One of the biggest things we did is to arrange all the budgets, get the budgets, organize them, debate them with, why do you want this, and tell me more about that, because we had to take the budgets and go to the Commission. Well, first we had to go to the damn comptroller, and I say “ damn” because we had to fight with him a lot. The comptroller kept trying to keep the cost down, and so then we end up in front of the Commission, and then they saw in front of them what it is Los Alamos wanted, or Livermore. And so our job as staff was try to defend why we supported that, or why we didn’t support one part of it, if we wanted to do that, which we did a few times. Then the comptroller would weigh in. Then the Commission would decide. They would send their budget to OMB [ Office of Management and Budget], I guess, and then it went to Congress. Then the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy would have hearings, not only on all parts of the AEC budget, but on the weapons budget. I had to appear before them and answer any questions they had about what, why, where, and when, and what have you. So a good portion of UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 14 our time was trying to know what’s going on in the labs for the budget purposes, and whether it made sense or not, at least to us. The other activity was the interface with Defense, partly through the Military Liaison Commission [ MLC] and partly directly on: what’s a new weapon, should we have a new weapon, should it look like this, what’s it for? And that meant interacting with the services as to why this was a good idea or a bad idea, what were the problems with it. At that time, there are two labs, competition, and they didn’t bother a lot to go through AFSWP to talk to the Department of Defense or to DMA, individuals, I mean; they were constantly inventing something they were sure the services wanted, and they would go in and try to sell it over there. To a particular service. To a service, yes, or to the— not the Secretary of Defense but in case there was a senior individual in DoD who happened be an ex- laboratory guy like there were. So they had their own sales pitch, not only in the Pentagon but in the Joint Committee. So Harold Agnew was one of the better salesmen, but they were all pretty good. And in some cases DMA found itself in between, a tug- of- war on things, because all of these ideas had budget implications as well as anything else. Well, when I arrived there, they had this phase structure. Phase 1, we just encouraged the labs— we didn’t have to encourage them, but they were encouraged to— new ideas. “ Maybe this’ll do something.” Because the labs had a fair understanding of the military side of the use of these things by ’ 67, we said OK, if you want to work on something, write it up and we’ll call it a Phase 1 and both labs can do Phase 1 on the same idea. Like when the 280- millimeter cannon was developed, there were two competitions for the shell. We encouraged competition between UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 15 the labs deliberately on each and every application, because we said, either lab can build either one of these things. And so we encouraged competition, so that was the reason Livermore was born. And there was a check- and- balance. When somebody got too carried away with his ideas, the other lab would say, now wait a minute, you guys are too far out [ 00: 35: 00] on the science pole. And so we encouraged critiques. What we found was, one lab would hold the test data and wouldn’t give it to the other ones; so they’d get a strong lecture, now wait a minute, that’s Uncle Sam’s data, you give it to the other lab because it’s technical data. So we continually had to kind of say, fellows, share your understanding because you’re not going to get to use it till the development of the next weapon. There was competition to really be given Stage 3, which was the actual development. Stage 1 is just an idea, and they can do all they want and they can throw the papers away. Stage 2, it’s come to the point where it’s definitive enough to try it out on the military through the MLC maybe or maybe direct, to see if we could get an official reaction out of them. And if we did, then we would have a Phase 2 development, which would probably, not always, sometimes would be gi