Interview with Linda (Mack) Smith, October 6, 2006

Nevada Test Site Oral History Project University of Nevada, Las Vegas Interview with Linda Smith October 6, 2006 Las Vegas, Nevada Interview Conducted By Mary Palevsky © 2007 by UNLV Libraries Oral history is a method of collecting historical information through recorded interviews conducted by an interviewer/ researcher with an interviewee/ narrator who possesses firsthand knowledge of historically significant events. The goal is to create an archive which adds relevant material to the existing historical record. Oral history recordings and transcripts are primary source material and do not represent the final, verified, or complete narrative of the events under discussion. Rather, oral history is a spoken remembrance or dialogue, reflecting the interviewee’s memories, points of view and personal opinions about events in response to the interviewer’s specific questions. Oral history interviews document each interviewee’s personal engagement with the history in question. They are unique records, reflecting the particular meaning the interviewee draws from her/ his individual life experience. Produced by: The Nevada Test Site Oral History Project Departments of History and Sociology University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 89154- 5020 Director and Editor Mary Palevsky Principal Investigators Robert Futrell, Dept. of Sociology Andrew Kirk, Dept. of History The material in the Nevada Test Site Oral History Project archive is based upon work supported by the U. S. Dept. of Energy under award number DEFG52- 03NV99203 and the U. S. Dept. of Education under award number P116Z040093. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in these recordings and transcripts are those of project participants— oral history interviewees and/ or oral history interviewers— and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U. S. Department of Energy or the U. S. Department of Education. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 1 Interview with Linda Smith October 6, 2006 Conducted by Mary Palevsky Table of Contents Introduction: experiences as a child in Las Vegas during atmospheric testing: duck- and- cover drills, blood typing, visits to Mount Charleston 1 Views on testing and nuclear waste storage in Nevada 3 Distinction between blood typing and blood testing programs in Nevada 4 Legacy of atmospheric testing and advent of AEC Nevada Operations Office [ NVOO] ( 1962) and underground testing at the NTS 5 Involvement with Cannikin ( 1970): logistics, NEPA and Supreme Court justice’s ruling, community involvement 6 Details of Baneberry ( 1970) and its aftermath: future of testing and influence of Robert Brownlee in creation of Containment Evaluation Panel [ CEP] 14 Competition and cooperation between Los Alamos and Livermore laboratories 19 Differences between AEC excepted service and regular Civil Service system, “ chaos” with creation of ERDA ( 1977) 21 Importance of participation in CEP for later career advancement and description of the management model of the test program 23 Work as a management analyst for AEC, move to Phoenix, AZ ( 1979) and progression into management with various government organizations 25 Return to Las Vegas, NV ( 1985), becomes Director of Organization and Personnel Division, rises to SES position with DOE 27 How the testing program changed ( late 1980s): thriving underground testing program, focus on environmental monitoring and safety and health, verification testing with the USSR, introduction of Raytheon as a contractor, DBM programs 31 Emergence of Rocky Flats as “ a major perturbation in the system,” ADM Watkins becomes head of DOE, testing becomes very procedural and bureaucratic 33 NASA, DoD, and origin of big contractor relationships with the federal government 35 Work on Diamond Sculls ( 1972) 36 Traditions associated with a test, steps in completing a test, observation of subsidence crater, drill- back and data recovery 38 Emotional impact of experiencing a shot 40 Incursion of protesters at the NTS, internal and external threats to security 41 Thoughts on being a woman deputy manager at the NTS, women in SES, and lack of “ scientific pedigree” among later managers 44 Requirements of deputy manager position at the NTS 45 Organizational changes re: DOE vs. AEC; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Joint Verification Experiment ( 1988- 1989), North Korea’s nuclear program 46 Reflects on the future of the NTS and Complex 2030, retirement, end of an era 49 Conclusion: Bruce Church and genesis of Atomic Testing Museum and archives 50 UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 1 Interview with Linda Smith October 6, 2006 in Las Vegas, Nevada Conducted by Mary Palevsky [ 00: 00: 00] Begin Track 2, Disc 1. Mary Palevsky: Linda Smith, thank you for meeting with me again. As I just said off- mike, I’d be interested for you to talk a little bit to me, because even though you’re not a Las Vegas native you are a long- time Las Vegan, about your experience as a young person. You both saw atmospheric tests, experienced civil defense drills as all of us did from that era, but you were living in a place where some of that testing actually occurred. And then children in Las Vegas, I understand, did another kind of thing related to the testing, which was the blood testing. Linda Smith: Absolutely. So why don’t we talk a little bit about that and then we’ll jump forward to ’ 65 and your work at the [ Nevada] test site. OK. When I was in grade school, in a very small school in East Las Vegas, Nevada, at that time, it was Whitney, Nevada, and there were actually four grades in one class. It was the Duck Creek Grammar School, which is no longer in existence, of course. But definitely duck- and- cover, and it was done, as I recall, I couldn’t say that it was done weekly but it was certainly done monthly. And that all of us definitely were typed and wore tags, literally had tags that identified your blood type, and do you know, I think that there wasn’t a lot of concern about that. There never was, that I was aware of, that much concern as kids about the atmospheric testing program, other than it was an entertainment factor. You would brag about whether your family would take you to the Mount Charleston turnoff early in the morning to see the lights, if you will, the effects of the atmospheric tests when they did occur because they were well publicized. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 2 So I don’t sense that there was fear. I do think that there was a little humor in all of that, in that you would have these very complex instructions on what to do in case there was an atomic attack or an escape of radiation, that you would go to the local post office and file a form. And we would all say, now, sure, that’s the first thing you’re going to do is find your way to the post office. So there were a lot of sort of bizarre things that were associated with that that didn’t make a lot of sense as a kid. But I didn’t lose any sleep, I don’t think anybody that I knew lost any sleep over it. That whole era of nuclear fear which was manifested in the movies and television and in many arenas, you just lived with, I think, it became second nature. And I think more so here because we were so used to seeing it on the front page, so used to, if you will, it became very casual. I know [ it] is probably not a good word to use in this day and age because I can’t imagine that anybody would think it was casual. In fact, as I look back on it, it’s rather unreal, if you will, that that could be the case. Did you ever go with your family out to Mount Charleston? I remember one occasion, and I couldn’t even tell you when it was but I do remember one occasion when we actually did drive out early in the morning to see it closer, to be there closer to it when it happened, and it was, wow! Quite a sight to see. Now when you’re waiting, you know approximately when it’s going to go off but did you— Just in general terms because you don’t know for sure if the wind conditions are going to be such that it would be delayed or whatever. So what happens when you realize it’s happening? What do you see? Do you recall? I can remember seeing color and I can remember seeing a cloud. That I can remember, as best as I can recall, it was like quite a startling experience. But it wasn’t frightening. Now that’s the UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 3 interesting part of it, because it’s almost as if you’re watching fireworks on the Fourth of July, I don’t know, when you’re a kid. And it was so accepted. I can remember later in my career, many times going into Frenchman Flat and actually walking on ground zeros of [ 00: 05: 00] some of the balloon shots and thinking, you know, it’s just almost surreal, thinking that you actually probably saw one of these explode, you know. Yes. That’s interesting, Linda. And we were talking before about context. I don’t know how, as a child, you would be able to put that in context. No, I don’t either. No. And I don’t know what the answer to that is. You couldn’t because there wasn’t much reality to it in terms of— certainly we knew about Nagasaki and Hiroshima, but there wasn’t a connection there particularly. And it was for the good of the country. I mean it was a defense issue. Nevada was always very strong from a defense posture standpoint. There was no feeling or discussion about the fact that Nevada was being used in a negative way as a testing ground for this kind of technology, which is rather amazing. Now it may have existed but if it did, it was certainly not manifested in any public way, certainly not the way you would see it now. I mean, no way! And I would agree. I would be on the other side of the issue, for sure. What do you mean? Well, I mean if someone said to me that we were going to do atmospheric testing, which would never happen, in this state, I would be very, very much opposed to that. Why? Oh, because I can’t even imagine. It wouldn’t happen. Environmentally, it wouldn’t happen. It’s just not— underground testing is different, in my opinion, OK. And I will draw that, and I’m certainly on the other side of the fence on Yucca Mountain, which is the storage of highly radioactive waste from nuclear reactors. I feel very, very much that this is probably the best UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 4 temporary solution. But atmospheric testing is— I mean it was done without the knowledge perhaps of what the impact was on the environment, I can say that. But we know now that that can’t happen again. But it may in North Korea. No, and that would be underground. I’m sure that would be underground. Of course it would. That’s why they’re looking around like that. It’s interesting, isn’t it, how complex that is, that it’s so hard for nations now to test, and that’s why I want to get in with you in a little what happened at the test site that developed that science and technology. But one question about the blood typing. You say you wore— We didn’t— when I say occasionally would wear the dog tags, had dog tags, always had dog tags in the younger years, not in high school but in the younger years. But would you have periodically blood drawn to see that the blood was OK or— No. That was just typing. It was just the typing, which was a civil defense regime that just said we know your blood type and we know if anything happens that we would know your blood type. Oh, because I thought that was a— OK, now I have to go back and look at my history, because I don’t know if that was nationwide that that was done or if that was done in Nevada because of the test site. I don’t know the answer to that. Certainly it was done here. It very well could be that it was done nationwide, which might not have been an artifact of testing per se. That’s what I have to find out because I— But if you’re in a certain area— now we were not Downwinders, obviously. I was in Henderson, and Las Vegas and Henderson were not in the path of the so- called track of the cloud. If you UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 5 were in southern Utah, if you were in downwind areas, it could very well could be the case. Well, I know they were doing blood testing. OK, that’s a good distinction. So it was not happening generally— In southern Nevada. When I say southern Nevada, certainly not in the Las Vegas valley, that I am aware of. At least we didn’t experience it. That’s very interesting. But Bruce Church would be a good one to ask, from the standpoint of being the same age category and having gone to grammar school in southern Utah, in Hurricane, so that would be a good person to find out. [ 00: 10: 00] I can ask him that. Well, thank you for that. So now we’re going to fast- forward basically over a lot of the interview you gave me last time to ’ 65 at the test site when underground testing is in its infancy. And one thing you said before we turned on the recorder was, for lack of a better word, you’ll be able to say it better than I can, the legacy of the atmospheric testing days in the early- and- mid- sixties at the test site and how you interpret that. Tremendous. A tremendous sort of influence, if you will, of obviously the people who were involved in the atmospheric testing program, primarily in Albuquerque [ AEC’s Albuquerque Operations Office was responsible for NTS testing program prior to 1962]. Remember, the Nevada Operations Office [ NVOO] had just come into existence in 1962 as an entity, that was a program entity for the Nevada Test Site programs, brought with it the Albuquerque people that were responsible for the atmospheric testing program. James Reeves, many, many of the so- called principal staff in the office just came from Albuquerque atmospheric testing program, and that influence prevailed until— well, to some degree probably still prevails; but it certainly prevailed until the late eighties, early nineties, when you saw a lot of changeover in the UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 6 leadership of the staff, people who grew up with underground nuclear weapons testing as opposed to having actually experienced the atmospheric testing program. And of course it was also a very interesting time for the office because there was the peaceful use of nuclear weapons program, Plowshare program activities that were going on; and a lot of activity on sites outside of the Nevada Test Site, which is not generally well known. People tend to be somewhat surprised to find out that we were actually doing things in New Mexico and Alaska and in other areas, a lot of those related to Plowshare, some not related to Plowshare. When I went into the— I think during our last interview I told you that I was in a management analyst position with [ AEC] Human Resources; when I moved into the manager’s office as an administrative assistant, that gave me an opportunity that was pretty unique because I then was able to be involved in some of the actual support activities for these rather unique tests that were occurring at the time, one being Cannikin. You’ve probably got a lot of oral history now on Cannikin, I would imagine, but that was unique in many, many ways. Well, I do have some, but why don’t you talk to me about it from your point of view, and what year was Cannikin? Well, Cannikin was in 1970. Actually it was detonated, I think, on November 6, 1970 after a long and arduous Supreme Court battle the decision as to whether it could be detonated happened on the day of the detonation, on November the sixth. I think that was a Saturday, even. I don’t remember that for sure. I was asked by the manager, Bob Miller, to pack my bags and go to Alaska. And I was a little stunned and dumbfounded at the thought of this, but he said he needed a support base there to essentially make sure that the scientists and the consultants that were coming in from all over for this test were logistically coordinated, so that was quite a role, to say the least. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 7 Well, let’s talk about that a little more. So what phase of the project is this? This is actually, now remember, Cannikin was the proof test of the Spartan warhead, that was the W71, and that was during the whole antiballistic missile [ ABM] period when a lot of money was being put into the ABM program. I think it was— at that time two hundred million dollars, quite a sum of money. But the W71, and of course there had been preliminary tests to [ 00: 15: 00] essentially calibrate the area because you’re doing it on Amchitka Island, which is in the Aleutian chain, and in preparation for that there were two shots, Milrow and there was another one, Long Shot. It was Long Shot and then Milrow, which were essentially calibration tests. Drilling a hole nearly six thousand feet deep. This is just almost incredible. And it was, at the period that I was asked to go, it was within probably three weeks of the detonation. So I found myself on an airplane with Roger Ray, he was going up at the same time I was. I was just almost— it was a dreamlike setting, believe me, to go from Las Vegas, Nevada, and I had not been too many places in my life, and to wind up landing in Anchorage, Alaska, going to the sixth floor of the Royal Inn hotel in Anchorage, where we essentially had set up a command post for the coordination and detonation. Well actually, the shot was detonated on Amchitka Island, so you had essentially two centers of activity. But the national press, I mean the international press, this was just absolutely the focus, if you will, of not only this country but several others because this was the largest underground test ever conducted in the United States, five megatons. And of course you’re in Anchorage in November, so there is no daylight; you’re kind of fighting with that all the time. And we had I would guess in the Anchorage area probably, oh, fifty to seventy- five people— of course it was a [ Lawrence] Livermore [ National Laboratory] test. Phil Coyle was the test director. So we had a contingent from Livermore, we had the Los Alamos [ National Laboratory] people who were supporting the test as well, and of course you had all of the normal UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 8 entities that support nuclear weapons testing. You had the [ U. S.] Weather Service, you had USGS [ U. S. Geological Survey], you had Sandia [ National Laboratories]. And of course REECo [ Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company] was very prominent because they were the ones that had actually done the drilling through subcontractors, the drilling of the hole, which was no small feat because of the water issues. The [ Atomic Energy Commission, AEC] chairman, Jim Schlesinger decided to come to the event and bring his family, and put them right on the island, which was another very startling event that we had to deal with from a public relations standpoint. And it was just a new twist and turn a minute. So give me an idea. You arrive. You’ve been asked by Miller to coordinate things. What, you’re a thirty- year- old woman, is that right? Yes. And the first question is, what was the ratio of men to women? Oh, let me count the women out of that sixty— maybe three of us, three or four to know, yeah. Did you know these other people? Oh absolutely, because they were people that we had worked with. Bill [ William] Ogle of course was there. Let me think. All of these people we had worked with in the testing program that were there. The deputy manager, Dr. Charles Williams, who had recently come to the Nevada office from Livermore, was really in charge of the Anchorage operations. Bob Thalgott who was the test manager at that time for all testing activities, the assistant manager for operations, was the man that was really going to be on the island and was on the island the day it was detonated. And then we had many of our internal people, scientists, we had just recently hired a Dr. Elwood M. Douthett to take care of health and safety or to [ 00: 20: 00] be the health and safety representative. Remember, this was the first test that was subject to NEPA, because NEPA was enacted in 1969. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 9 Explain that to me. National Environmental Policy Act. So that meant you had to develop an environmental impact statement [ EIS] now. So this was the very first test that was subject to NEPA and had a specific environmental impact statement that was written about it. So let me understand. This is something I didn’t know about. For there on forward, at Nevada or anywhere, this had to be done, is that what you’re saying? Actually yes, and let me kind of qualify that. For the offsites, you would have to have a specific environmental impact statement or go through a NEPA process which could result in an environmental impact statement. When you go through a NEPA process, you make a decision as to whether an EIS is required or not. It may be that you only need an environmental assessment, which is a lot less demanding, if you will. Obviously when you’re going to Amchitka Island and detonating a five- megaton bomb, you do an environmental impact statement. And all of that was what was being challenged in court. That was an interesting historical point because this was the first, it was challenged in court, it held up at the Supreme Court, and the decision came down the day of the detonation. Rather remarkable, because it wouldn’t probably have happened at all that way today; I don’t know. But the test was detonated, of course. We could feel it. We were rocking and rolling on the sixth floor of the Royal Inn in Anchorage, and looking out a window and looking at the high rise across from us and it was just a very rolling motion, and thinking, ooh, and we’ve got Jim Schlesinger, his wife and child sitting on that island. And everything went just very well. It was a seven [ 7.0], I believe from an earthquake measurement standpoint, on the Richter scale. When you’re going back and forth like that, what are you thinking? UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 10 Ooh, is it going to stop? Which it always did. But every time I’ve gone through it, you think, ooh, boy, let’s get this over with. You said something interesting. I had this image, it just shows you how interesting it is to talk to people, so you’re going up to Alaska as if you’d be in a new environment, but what you just described is that there’s this community of people. Oh, absolutely. And so you’re known and they know you. Absolutely. That’s fascinating. Now there was a lot of interaction with the community. Now that’s interesting too because there was no major cultural issue in Anchorage or political issue. There were events with the community; for example, they had a reception for us, as I recall, in the hotel and it was a very wonderful affair and all of the local officials were there, and so there wasn’t a feeling of it being a negative relationship, for sure. But you’re right, you’re very much encased, if you will, in the culture that you bring, and especially in this case because everything was so frantic, and you were getting communications things set up. You can imagine, people were at high stress levels. Certainly the manager of the office was at high stress levels, making sure everybody else was, too, which was understandable. And so there was a lot of internal tension that we were witnessing, for sure. And what kinds of things did you actually end up doing daily? Were you putting out fires or were you actually— Oh, all of that and arranging for a lot of logistical management things, making sure that there were government vehicles for whoever needed them. In [ 00: 25: 00] one case, a couple of the UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 11 scientists that were supposed to have been there two weeks before they didn’t show up on time, so we were tracking them down to find out what circuitous route they had taken. And morning till night. Trying to get administrative support areas set up, and making sure that you had the equipment in place and that everybody was notified. Doing a lot of internal communications, writing memos, sending TWXs [ Typewriter Exchanges] and all of that sort of thing. TWXs? Well, those are teletypes. We called them TWXs. And that’s how we lived. We lived by the TWX. Interesting. Absolutely. And then a lot of fun with that, which was a tension- reliever. Everybody had a wonderful sense of humor. There was never any sense of hierarchy or rank, ever, in any of the activities that you participated in like this. Never. I mean everybody was an equal. The Bill Ogles, the scientists, the engineers. Henry Vermillion [ sp] was our public information officer and he would have press briefings in the lobby of the Royal Inn and there would be hundreds of reporters, and he just stayed cool, calm, and collected. It was just a time when it was— it was very interesting. Now what’s your consciousness of what’s going on in the Supreme Court, because you’re there in these last weeks. Are you— Oh, we’re tracking it. Absolutely. Actually when I say it had gone to the Supreme Court, it went to a Supreme Court justice for a decision, so it wasn’t the full- blown Supreme Court, as I recall. I would have to, as a point of accuracy on that, go back and check. We’ll look it up. But that makes sense. [ In a 4 to 3 decision on November 6, 1971, the Supreme Court refused to halt the Cannikin test]. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 12 Yes. And the decision, as I said, was right down to the wire. It was almost like a dead man walking— you’re thinking, either we’re going or we’re not, you just literally did not know. So was it that you had that as your shot day and if he had said no— it would’ve been “ he” in those days— everything would’ve stopped. Absolutely. It wasn’t the converse or the reverse, which was he said OK and then you went. No, no, no. You were counting it down to the— Absolutely. That’s it. Now once it happened, what was the response? In the immediate aftermath, people felt that it was a success or what happens right afterwards? Oh yeah, very relieved, congratulatory. The word was coming back from the island that things were— now remember, you also had on that island incredibly high winds that day. I’m thinking, of course you’re in the Aleutians, and this is November, but I think, there were 120- mile winds or something like this. It was an incredible weather pattern. So that was all at play. And decisions were made to just proceed. And you wait until there’s a time when, and I think it was eleven o’clock that was the detonation time, and that would’ve been Bering Standard Time, I suppose. I guess. But yes, relief. Now, interestingly enough, Jim Schlesinger, who is a birdwatcher, decided that a day or two after the event he wanted to go to a nearby island because there was a rare bird that he wanted to view. So we were really struggling with that one. Do we put this man in a boat and take him to some island where he can birdwatch? And the feeling was we did not want to do that, but as it wound up that did happen. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 13 Why didn’t you want to? Oh, because it was just, what if anything happened. You just say to yourself, my gosh, everybody’s looking at you and you don’t want anything like that to happen. So there was a lot of concern and a lot of internal strife about that, but he decided he would do that. [ 00: 30: 00] Because it was basically on your watch that that would happen. It wasn’t like he was wandering around somewhere in Washington. Yes, absolutely. And we had been involved— remember, in 1969, the year that I went in the manager’s office— we had a major, major plane crash that killed an AEC commissioner. It wasn’t our plane; it was a [ National] Park Service plane. I’m sure you’ve heard a little bit about this in some of the interviews that you’ve done. Which was— the crash where? This was the Tommy Thompson crash at Lake Mead. Yes, OK. I’m sure you’ve heard about that. So I mean there was kind of that, I think, in all of our psyches because we lived through that, and that was a terrible time, dragging Lake Mead to see if we could find the bodies. And then of course Baneberry in 1970. So we had some precursors to all of this. And we’ll go back and pick those two things up, but what is your consciousness of the challenges that are being voiced to Cannikin? On a day- to- day basis, do you have time to think about the political atmosphere? No, not at all. Not at all. You had Greenpeace. Absolutely. But there is such a strong bias to get it done that overrides everything. Is there any profound discussion of should we- shouldn’t we? Is this good for the country? Is it not? There’s no question. You are there to get it done. And the UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 14 team, this incredibly seamless team, with all of these agencies you and I were talking about earlier, once again is supreme, and prevails. They do the technologically impossible. And we know that the W71 warhead works well. Ironically, it was dismantled the year after I retired, in 1995. The whole ABM concept was interesting. Of course that was well before Ronald Reagan, and Star Wars. So that was the first really large, large— and again, the largest we ever did, and to do it offsite. What was the largest test on the test site, underground? I know I can look in the book [ DOE/ NV— 209- REV 15 December 2000], but while we��re on that, I think, was it Boxcar? Boxcar, and it was on the Pahute Mesa, and it was 500, maybe? No, it was a megaton. It was at least a megaton. . I’m just almost sure it was one- something [ 1.3 megatons]. But while I’m looking, so at what point do you leave Amchitka and come back? Shortly after? It was within the next maybe four or five days because it took that long to get everything, in essence, dismantled and to do all of the reporting, to make sure that everything was pretty well cleaned up before we left, and then we came back to the real world. One- point- three, according to the book. One- point- three yield. I was going to say I knew it was under 1.5. Yeah, that was a large one. The next one that I can remember I was involved in that was very unique was Rio Blanco, which is, it was essentially part of the peaceful. Let’s go back. I’m thinking of so many things to ask you about, Linda, but there are a couple of things. It’d be really interesting to hear again, because this is important, what was going on in your office with Baneberry when that happens, because I have that story from sort of various points of view out at the site. UNLV Nevada Test Site Oral History Project 15 [ 00: 35: 00] Oh, very interesting. Yes. Baneberry was an absolute shock to the system. There is no doubt about that. I don’t think there was any sense that there would have been. Of course it went right through the— at that point we didn’t have a formal Containment Evaluation Panel [ CEP]. All of those things resulted from Baneberry. Bob Brownlee has given you that, I’m sure, in tortuous detail because he was one of the architects, if you will, of the reconstruction after Baneberry. He did a fine job because it never happened again. But Baneberry, the day that it happened, I was in the manager’s office, and it was a rather routine day and it was before lunch, probably, oh gosh, I would say 10: 30 or eleven. It was close to noontime, as I recall. And the deputy manager [ Charles Williams] who was the person that I worked directly for was in the back of the building on Highland Avenue, which is where we resided until the mid- 1990s. And there were plate glass windows looking out north toward the test site. And he came back from that part of the building into the front office, came through those glass doors, and said, This is the end of the test program. And I said, What are you talking about? He said, Go back there and take a look. And man, [ snapping fingers] he was on the phone like that. “ Take a look,” meaning? Look at the— you could see it. You could see it. Now it wasn’t an explosion, but it was a distinct— as I recall, it almost looked like something was burning, so it was dust, I’m sure. So who was the de