## Israel-Lebanon In Search of a New Relationship

The agreement finally reached between Israel and Lebanon, after more than four months of difficult negotiations in which the United States played a pivotal role, reflects four essentials on which Israel and Lebanon see eye to

a. Termination of the state of war between

Lebanon and Israel.

b. Respect for each other's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and right to live in peace, within secure and recognized borders.

c. Withdrawal from Lebanese territory as a natural corollary of the previous proposition - of all external forces (PLO terrorists, Syrian and Israel). and

d. Agreement that Lebanon must not again become a base for hostile activity against Israel - and that measures will be undertaken to prevent such a development.

2. A number of further steps will have to be taken, within the months to come, to 'fill out' the agreement and to make possible its

full implementation.

3. Thus, propositions (a) and (b), above require a gradual normalization of mutual relations - including the peaceful and unhampered movement of goods, products and persons, communications, etc. Some of these things will need to be formalized in bilateral agreements.

4. Proposition (c) - withdrawal of forces, requires, first of all, the withdrawal of those forces that precipitated the near - collapse of Lebanon during the last decade-and-a-half and the conditions that made Israel's operation Peace for Galilee in the summer of 1982 inevitable. It requires, in other words, the withdrawal of all PLO elements and the simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanese soil - together with the Israel Defense Forces now stationed in Southern Lebanon.

LAS VEGAS ISRAELITE

will require carefully worked - out follow-up measures and arrangements, to ensure that the security region set up in Southern Lebanon under the terms of the agreement will indeed perform the function it is intended to perform.

6. The Israeli Lebanese negotiations were impeded and complicated all along, not only by the heterogeneous character of the Lebanese government, which greatly reduced the scope of the Lebanese delegation's bargaining authority at the talks, but also - probably -- mainly by Lebanon's hesitancy in making any kind of move without the approval of its eastern neighbor, Syria, and other Arab countries. In effect, this gave Syria - and, behind it, the Soviet Union virtual veto power over Lebanon's positions and decisions, a stance strongly influenced - and supported - by the rest of the Arab states as well.

7. Israel, fully aware of Lebanon's sensitivities in this regard, went out of its way to make concessions designed to smooth the way to an agreement. Thus, when the Lebanese delegation pleaded its Arab affiliation to justify its opposition to Israel's proposal that the present talks culminate in the signing of a peace treaty, Israel agreed to forego this most natural and reasonable of proposals and to content itself, for the time being, with a pragmatic arrangement of 'good neighborly relations.'

8. There were other Israeli concessions in the course of the talks, some of them in the realm of substantive issues, others in matters of wording. Always, the aim was to seek compromise wherever possible in order to keep open the chances of a successful conclusion of the talks -

and an agreement.

In the final analysis, Israel found it possible to make the concessions it did, because they paved the way for an agreement that does contain the four essential propositions mentioned in the first paragraph of this paper - as well as a number of additional clauses that lend a measure of substance and meaning to these basic propositions.

10. It is to be hoped that this agreement will serve as the foundation of a growing understanding between Israel and Lebanon, leading ultimately to the extension of the peace process, begun at Camp David, to all of Israel's neighbors.

## Nazi War Criminals Beware!!

The first Nazi war criminal to be deported from the United States in 30 years is now reportedly in West Germany and the message should ring loud and clear to all those who may think the United States lacks the determination to investigate, prosecute and finally deport Nazi war cri-minals: "He won't be the last,"

The flight of Hans Lipschis was verified last week by the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations (OSI), the bureau responsible with seeking out and prosecuting alleged Nazi war criminals in the United States. Lipschis admitted to the charges that he was a former SS-Rottenfuehrer (corporal) at the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp complex. The entire legal process against Lipchis began and ended within 10 months, "a source of great satisfaction," according to Eli Rosenbaum, an OSI prosecutor who worked on the case.

The OSI charged that Lipschis, a retired factory worker who entered the U.S. on August 15, 1956 and resided since then in Chicago, was personally involved in the persecution of civilians at the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp where he "ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in the persecution of persons....because of their race, religion, national origin, or political opin-

Lipschis was in 1946 "included by the War Crimes Group, Deputy Theatre Judge Advocate's Office, United States Forces European Theatre on a 'List of Perpetrators' of war crimes," according to OSI documentation, and his "appre-hension was sought by U.S. authorities" from that date.

The OSI, as in the case with all Nazi war criminals it prosecutes, must prove that they concealed, lied or misrepresented their activities during World War II when they applied for a visa or permanent residence in the U.S.

A resounding warning to Nazi war criminals was issued by Neil Sher, the acting director of the OSI, who said: "No longer can it be said that the threat of deportation is an idle one.



385-1441

